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Expropriation- Consequential Damages Under
the Constitution
Article I, Section 2, of the Louisiana Constitution provides in
part that compensation must be paid where private property is
taken or damaged for public purposes.' There are two situations
in which property may be damaged in the public interest under
this provision. One is where part of a person's property is ac-
quired, and the acquisition injures the remainder or residuum
of the property. 2 The other situation is where property near the
public improvement is injured even though no part of that prop-
erty is appropriated or physically invaded. s Some writers have
suggested that injuries incurred in connection with a partial
taking be termed severance damages to distinguish them from
those injuries which occur where there is no part of the property
taken, this latter situation giving rise to consequential damages.4
1. LA CONST. art. I, § 2: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, except by due process of law. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitu-
tion, private property shall not be taken or damaged except for public purposes
and after just and adequate compensation is paid."
2. See 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN, C. IV, Damages to Re-
maining Property - The Partial-Taking Cases (2d ed. 1953). The first Louisiana
case applying our provision in this context was Vicksburg, S & P. Ry. v. Dillard,
35 La. Ann. 1045 (1883).
3. See note 7 infra. The first case in Louisiana applying our damage provi-
sion in this context was Griffin v. Shreveport and Ark. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 808
(1889). Cf. Koelmel v. New Orleans, M. & C. Ry., 27 La. Ann. 442 (1875)
(prior to the damage provision, recovery for consequential damages refused). But
see Hill v. Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans R.R., 38 La. Ann. 599 (1886)
(no recovery for consequential damages, Article 156 (presently Article I, Sec-
tion 2) said not to be applicable) ; Tilton v. The New Orleans City R.R., 35 La-
Ann. 1062 (1883) (semble as to damage element) ; Werges v. St. Louis, Chicago
& New Orleans R.R., 35 La. Ann. 641 (1883) (recovery for consequential dam-
ages refused on grounds there was no negligence or culpable carelessness).
4. See Note, 10 FLA. L. REV. 354 (1957), which clearly presents the distinc-
tion. Cf. the position of Nichols on this point: "The term 'consequential dam-
ages' is ambiguous in character and is not truly relevant in any discussion re-
specting the different classes of damage. . . . The term is generally used with
reference to damage to property no part of which is appropriated." 2 NIcHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.4432 (3d ed. 1950).
To determine if there has been a "partial taking" and thus severance dam-
ages, some courts apply a three-fold test: (1) unity of ownership, (2) unity of
use, and (3) contiguity of the land areas. See Winner, Some Problems of Sever-
ance Damages, 29 DICTA 327 (1952). There has been no Louisiana development
on this point, probably because of the normal physical connection generally found
between the land taken and that injured. In any event, consideration on these
lines would be academic, since the injury will in most respects be recoverable
under the damage provision if recoverable at all. See the interesting case of Inter-
national Paper Co. v. United States, 227 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1955), 8 BAYLOR L.
REV. 354 (1956). Here severance damages were being asked for injury to a paper
mill 136 miles distant from the site of the condemned property. Such a technique
was resorted to because the federal government under the Federal Constitution is
not liable for consequential damages, but must pay for severance damages incurred
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There exists some judicial authority for this terminology 5 and
these terms will be used in this Comment. It should be noted,
however, that the designations "severance" and "consequential"
do not refer to the nature of the injury, but rather to the factual
situation giving rise to the injury. It seems clear that in Louisi-
ana the constitutional terms "taken" and "damaged" are to be
interpreted in the disjunctive, thus necessitating the payment of
compensation where property" is "merely" consequentially in-
jured.7 It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the condi-
tions which must exist to create a cause of action for consequen-
tial damages."
Historically the state constitutions only required compensa-
tion for property actually appropriated by the taker.9 Thus even
in connection with a partial taking. See Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530
(1913).
"Property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made upon
an owner's use of it to an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude
has been acquired either by agreement or in the course of time." United States
v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947). See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946). A single isolated act of injury will not constitute recoverable
damages. Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953). See Cooper v.
City of Bogalusa, 195 La. 1097, 198 So. 510 (1940), where plaintiff tried to say
that injury produced by federal government was authorized by Bogalusa so as to
collect damages from the latter.
5. See, e.g., Latourette v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 123, 125 (D. Ore. 1957)
"The term 'consequential damages' as used herein is deemed to mean damages to
property not actually taken but an injury to property that occurs as a natural re-
sult of an act lawfully done by another and for which no liability [under the fed-
eral rule] exists."
6. Under most decisions applying eminent domain statutes or provisions, the
only injury considered is that affecting real or immovable property. Hence, dam-
ages or injuries as hereafter used in this Comment will mean a diminution of
market value of the real estate. See Louisiana v. Sauls, 234 La. 241, 99 So.2d 97
(1958), where compensation was refused for "damages" suffered when the defend-
ant had to sell his movables at a loss.
7. The main cases are MeMahon v. St. Louis, Ark. & Texas R.R., 41 La. Ann.
827, 6 So. 640 (1889) ; Griffin v. The Shreveport and Ark. R.R., 41 La. Ann.
808 (1889). These cases involved an injury sustained for the benefit of the
public. At one time, it perhaps could have been argued that since the actor in the
above cases was a delegate of the sovereign, recovery for consequential damages
would not lie where the actor was the sovereign or an agency thereof, as was done
in Brock v. City of Anniston, 244 Ala. 544, 14 So.2d 519 (1943). But the case
of Jarnagin v. Highway Comm., 5 So.2d 660 (La. App. 1942) should have clearly
settled this point in the negative. After all, the power of eminent domain is
granted to either class for the benefit of the public good. See New Orleans, Ope-
lousas & G.W. R.R. v. Lagarde, 10 La. Ann. 150 (1855).
8. The subject of expropriation or acquisition of property by the exercise of the
power of eminent domain is covered generally in Comment, 18 LoUIsIANA LAW
REVIEW 509 (1958).
9. 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.38(4) (3d ed. 1950). Louisiana first in-
corporated a damage provision in its Constitution of 1879 (Article 156). Britt v.
Shreveport, '83 So.2d 476 (La. App. 1955). It would appear that legislative au-
thority allowing recovery of damages existed in Louisiana prior to 1879. Article
497 of the Civil Code of 1870 was expanded from the previous code by this pro-
vision: "By an equitable indemnity, in this case, is understood not only a pay-
ment for the value of the thing of which the owner is deprived, but a remunera-
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though the actual taking caused injury to the remainder of the
landowner's property, severance damages were non-recover-
able.10 A fortiori were such injuries not compensated, if there
was no appropriation of any part of the property." At the time
of the origin of these provisions in the United States in the
Eighteenth Century, such injuries were few, and the term
"taken" provided adequate compensation to the affected- land-
owners.' 2 However, with the development of mechanized trans-
portation and its concurrent needs for vast and permanent con-
structions of highways and- other public facilities, considerable
injury was inflicted which was beyond even the most liberal
interpretation of the word "taken."'' 3 With Illinois as the. leader
in revision, the words "or damaged" were added to many of the
state constitutions providing an additional basis for compensa-
tion for the damages which may be caused thereby." Article 2633 was interpreted
to encompass damages (see Britt v. Shreveport, supra) and Article 2632 specifi-
cally refers to damages. The source of this latter article in the Code of 1825 was
Article 2608, which does not refer to damages, but makes provision for plottage
value damage in principle. See 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITIONS
OF THE CIIL CODES OF LOUISiANA, pt. II, at 1440 (1942). The wording of Ar-
ticles 497 and 2632 apparently contemplates a physical taking as a condition prece-
dent to a recovery of damages. Thus it would appear that the requirement of
compensating consequential damages (as defined in this Comment) has its origin
as of 1879. Such a view is supported by McMahon v. The St. Louis, Ark. & Texas
R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889). The case- of Koelmel v. New Orleans,
M. & C. Ry., 27 La. Ann. 442 (,1875). fell between the statutory enactments and
the constitutional provision and there- the court reversed a lower court which had
awarded damages to a landowner who had been "injured" by the erection of a
nearby railroad. Justice Wyly, dissenting on several grounds, made the remark:
"In principle there is no difference between destroying the house and destroying
its usefulness to the owner." Id. at 443. The first application of the damage pro-
vision of the Constitution occurred in a partial taking case which adopted, in large
part the rationale of Justice Wyly. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. v. Dillard, 35 La. Ann.
1045 (1883).
10. The various provisions discussed at note 9 supra would seem to be suf-
ficient authority for a recovery of damages in a partial taking case prior to the
constitutional provision. But see Jarnagin v. Highway Comm., 5 So.2d 660, 663
(La. App. 1942): "Until [the damage provision was added to the Constitution]
an owner could recover only the market* or cash value of property actually
'taken' for public purposes. Consequential [severance] damages resulting from the
'taking' were not recoverable. The same was true as to those owners who were
simply damaged from the erection of some public improvement no part of whose
property was taken."
In most jurisdictions the lack of coverage as to damages was not fatal to a
recovery of damages if they occurred in the context of a. partial taking case, as
most elements of damages could be worked in on a liberal interpretation of the
word "taking." Even though there was no deliberatei appropriation, of even a part,
at times the damage could be so severe as to amount in. fact' to a "taking." This
latter construction of the word "taken" was worked to its utmost limits. 2 NICHOLS,
EMINENT DoMAIN § 6.38' (3d ed. 1950). It was where the injury incurred was
imperceptible physically that the most liberal interpretation of the word "taking"
was inadequate, and the real: need for an allowance of consequential damages felt.
11. Koelmel v. New Orleansi M. & C. Ry., 27 La. Ann. 442 (1875).
12. For general coverage relative to the historical aspects involved here, see 2
NICHOLS, EMINFNT DOMAN §-6.4 (3d. ed. 1950).
13. Ibid.
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tion. 14 Louisiana adopted a damage provision in its Constitution
in 1879 which has been applied to both severance and consequen-
tial damages.' 5 The injury occurring in severance and conse-
quential damages is essentially the same, that is, there is a de-
flation in the market value of property which has not been phys-
ically taken. Thus, there would appear to be no reason why the
absence of a taking of an injured whole, as in a consequential
damage situation, should be treated any different from the ab-
sence of a physical taking with respect to an injured part of the
property, as in a severance damage case. An examination of the
situations which give rise to severance damages will therefore
facilitate a consideration of consequential damages.
SEVERANCE DAMAGES
A classification of the recoverable injuries which may be in-
flicted on the remaining property of an owner where part of his
property is taken may be made in four general divisions :16 (1)
deflation of the market value of the remaining property because
of the general unattractiveness of the public improvement 7 or
because of its permanent' s interference with the convenient use
of the remaining property; 19 (2) deflation of the market value
14. See 2 NIC]IOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.38(4) (3d ed. 1950). See also the
state constitutions cited at Comment, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 256, 260, n. 36 (1947).
15. The present provision is in Article I, § 2. See note 1 supra. See Griffin
v. The Shreveport and Ark. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 808 (1889) (severance damages)
and McMahon v. The St. Louis, Ark. & Texas R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640
(1889) (consequential damages).
Perhaps the most specific legislative authorization allowing recovery for con-
sequential damages is MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 12, as amended, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 634 (1953). See Hanify, Elements of Damages in Eminent Domain, 34
B.U.L. REV. 146, 147 (1954).
16. The court generally does not distinguish between the several types of in-
jury, but terms them all damages, either severance damages, consequential dam-
ages, or severance and consequential damages. See Louisiana Highway Comm. v.
Boudreaux, 139 So. 521 (La. App. 1932), where the court considers several types
of injury.
17. See Helmer v. Colorado Southern, N.O. & P. Ry., 122 La. 141, 47 So. 443
(1908). But of. New Orleans, Ft. J. & G.I. Ry. v. Barton, 43 La. Ann. 171, 9 So.
19 (1891).
18. A lawful, temporary interference with a person's property does not con-
stitute a cause of action. Sholars v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 6 So.2d 153 (La.
App. 1942). Even though the property is acquired, if it be only temporarily, the
owner is entitled at most to only a fair rental. Louisville & N. R.R. v. R. E. E.
De Montluzin Co., 166 La. 211, 116 So. 854 (1928).
19. Louisiana Highway Comm. v. Guidry, 176 La. 389, 401, 146 So. 1, 5
(1933) : "Counsel for the state suggests that mere inconvenience and annoyance
caused by the building of the road do not constitute elements of damage. That is
true, but, if the inconvenience and annoyance in the use of the property are such
as to diminish its market value, the decrease in value is a damage which plaintiff
must pay." And at id. at 399, 146 So. at 4, it is said: "Considering these incon-
veniences which result from the cutting of this land in two by the highway . ..
the witnesses . . . testified . . . that the market value of the property would be
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of the remaining property because of a fear of subsequent tor-
tious injury by reason of the use of the acquired portion ;o (3)
deflation or destruction of the plottage value inherent in the
total and larger whole property by reason of the acquisition of
the part,21 and (4) expenses incurred by the owner of the re-
maining property in adjusting his estate to the occupation of
the acquired portion by the taker.22  Generally, severance dam-
ages are those injuries which render the remaining property less
valuable than it was before the acquisition or which make it
more expensive to maintain in its pre-acquisition state of utility.
To be recoverable the injury must affect market value; it cannot
be a personal injury to the owner.28 As long as the acquisition
materially decreased. . . . This diminution in value is not only present but pros-
pective, and the property is damaged to the extent of the decrease in value. This
damage is part of the compensation which must be paid for the taking of the
land." See Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R. v. Dillard, 35 La. Ann. 1045, 1048
(1883) : "Why should not the fact that the track of a railroad runs through the
heart of a plantation and severs its arteries, and dislocates its whole framework,
be an element of damage?"
20. The mere possibility of a subsequent tortious injury to the owner by reason
of the use made of the taken property is no basis for an award in damages in the
expropriation suit. Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Longview Sugar Co., 135 La. 542, 65
So. 638 (1914) ; Commercial Telegraph Cable Co. v. 'Prevost, 133 La. 47, 62 So.
347 (1913) ; Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Sarpy, 125 La. 388, 51 So. 433 (1910).
But if the effect of the fear of such injury in the future is to depreciate the
market value of the remaining property, this depreciation is an element of dam-
ages. Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Teissier, 134 La. 958, 965, 64 So. 866, 868 (1914) ;
"If the evidence had shown a depreciation in the value of the land along plain-
tiffs right of way by reason of danger from fire to improvements or crops, such
damage would be allowed." This follows even though the fear is in fact ground-
less. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. National Gasoline Co., 203 La. 787, 14 So.2d 636
(1943).
21. Plottage value is "an increment of value arising as a consequence of the
combining of two or more sites so as to develop one site having a greater utility
than the aggregate of each when separately considered." APPRAISAL TERMINOLOGY
AND HANDBOOK 119 (1950).
See Louisiana Highway Comm. v. Boudreaux, 139 So. 521 (La. App. 1932).
Market value of several tracts diminished considerably by their insignificant area
remaining after the acquisition and by reason of their separation from the main
tract.
Some writers would call the destruction of plottage value "severance dam-
ages" and all other injuries "consequential damages." See Comment, Consequential
Damages, 35 VA. L. REv. 1064 (1949). This Comment does not employ that
distinction.
22. Department of Highways v. Laird, 219 La. 567, 53 So.2d 674 (1951)
(moving buildings, extending electrical wiring, rearranging fences) ; Public Belt
R.R. Comm. v. Atkinson, 180 La. 992, 158 So. 363 (1935) (reconstructing road-
way) ; Louisiana Highway Comm. v. Guidry, 176 La. 389, 146 So. 1 (1933)
(fencing, gates, headlands) ; Highway Comm. v. Hoell, 174 La. 302, 140 So. 485
(1932) (rearranging houses, constructing fences) ; New Orleans Pac. Ry. v. Mur-
rell, 36 La. Ann. 344 (1884) (rearranging headlines, bridges) ; Louisiana Highway
Comm. v. Treadway, 173 So. 209 (La. App. 1937), affirmed on rehearing, 175 So.
94 (La. App. 1937) (bridges) ; Louisiana Highway Comm. v. Boudreaux, 139 So.
521 (La. App. 1932) (1,450 feet of fencing). See Louisiana Highway Comm. v.
Bradberry, 193 So. 198 (La. App. 1940), where the case was remanded to deter-
mine the cost of bridges and ramps.
23. See Carter v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 6 So.2d 159, 160 (La. App.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
adversely affects the market value of the remaining property,
any type of injury would seem to be recoverable as severance
damages. 24 Recovery is generally made for severance damages
in the same suit in which compensation is given for the prop-
erty actually acquired. 2  There is some authority to the effect
that the total award is to be composed of two separate items,
severance damages and market value of the acquired portion, 26
but the better position is to determine the total award by the
difference between the market value of the total property before
the acquisition and the market value of the property remaining
after the acquisition.27 Whether the market value plus damages
rule or the before and after rule is used is important only in
relation to minor qualifications which adjust award value. 2 In




Recovery is denied for injuries inflicted in connection with
a partial taking where they do not affect market value, but are
1942) : "The only damage that is compensable is a special damage to the' owner
with respect to his property, resulting in its depreciation in value, in excess of that
sustained by the public generally."
24. See Parish Council v. Koller, 94 So.2d 505 (La. App. 1957) (loss of
esthetic values not per se compensable, but recovery is possible if the market value
of the property is affected thereby).
25. See, e.g., Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 197 La. 439, 1 So.2d 686
(1941) and Louisiana Highway Comm. v. DeBouchel, 174 La. 968, 142 So. 142
(1932).
26. See Highway Comm. v. Ferguson, 176 La. 642, 146 So. 319 (1933) ; Loui-
siana & N. R.R. v. R. E. E. de Montluzin, 166 La. 211, 166 So. 854 (1928);
Louisiana Ry'. & Nay. Co. v. Xavier'Realty Co., 115 La. 328, 39 So. 1 (1905).
27. In this manner all the elements of severance damage' are lumped' into one
computation, except perhaps item number four, which is generally capable of more
objective determination and is usually handled as an isolated item. Texas Pipe
Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 220, 85 So.2d 260, 271 (1955) is the leading case
on the method of determining the damages generally. There the rule adopted was
clearly the before and after rule. The quantum of the damages (which in such a
computation includes the value of the land) is the difference between the market
value of the total property before and after the acquisition. In the court's words:
"To make ourselves perfectly clear, defendants must effectively show the market
value of each tract immediately before and immediately after the expropriation in
order to establish the quantum of their severance damages." See Police Jury v.
Hernandez, 232 La. 1, 93 So.2d 672 (1957) (affirming).
28. Some courts say that benefits can only be offset against the damage in-
curred by the remaining property, and may not offset the amount due for the
land taken. See 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN 295 (2d ed.
1953). In Louisiana, benefits cannot be offset against the damages unless the
injury is special to the property affected and not general to the community.
Louisiana Highway Comm. v. Hoell, 174 La. 302, 140 So. 485 (1932).
29. For further discussion on this problem of the various methods to comptute
the total award due in the case of a partial taking, see generally JAIM, EMINENT
DOMAIN § 98 (1953); 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 48 (2d
ed. 1953).
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merely personal to the landowner.8 These injuries encompass
such items as inconvenience,3 1 loss of business and good will,32
moving costs33 and mental suffering.34 Even though they arise
out of an exercise of the power of eminent domain they are
termed incidental damages for which the owner can receive no
compensation. 35 It was early decided in Louisiana that the ad-
dition of the word "damage" to the constitution did not cover
such items.36 The reasons given for refusing recovery here gen-
erally reflect a judicial hesitancy to enter into such a many
faceted area of personal property injury. Some have said that
in such cases the taker is not acquiring any item which has
caused deprivation to the owner, and, since the injuries will
differ so materially according to the individual owner, that they
can only be speculative.3 T Perhaps a more logical explanation
30. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Maguire, 219 La. 740, 54 So.2d 4 (1951).
Cf. Hoggatt v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R., 34 La. Ann. 624 (1882), where
the landowner sought damages because the property taken from him was alleged
to have been diverted from the purpose for which it had been expropriated. Re-
covery was denied when no diversion was found.
31. Housing Authority v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295 (1942). But if the
inconvenience is of such a nature as to depreciate the value of the remaining prop-
erty then that depreciation is a proper element of recoverable damages. Highway
Comm. v. Guidry, 176 La. 389, 146 So. 1 (1933) ; Highway Comm. v. Hoell, 174
La. 302, 140 So. 485 (1932).
32. In expropriation it is the property that is normally acquired and not the
business conducted thereon. Thus it is generally well settled that the profit-making
capacity of the business is not to be considered in fixing the amount of the award.
Housing Authority v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295 (1942) and Opelousas
Gulf & N.E. Ry. v. St. Landry Cotton Oil Co., 121 La. 796, 46 So. 810 (1908)
seem to follow this principle. However, Department of Highways v. Laird, 219
La. 567, 53 So.2d 674 (1951) seemed to predicate a refusal of recovery for such
an item on the failure of proof.
33. School Board v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So.2d 40 (1957) and Department
of Highways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955). Housing Authority v.
Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295 (1942) predicated a refusal of recovery for this
item on the failure of proof.
34. Nagle v. Police Jury, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425 (1932) and Highway Comm.
v. DeBouchel, 174 La. 968, 142 So. 142 (1932).
35. See JAIE, EMINENT DOMAIN 134 (1953) : "The recoverable damages are
sometimes referred to as severance damages and sometimes as consequential dam-
ages. The nonrecoverable damages are frequently termed incidental damages."
36. McMahon v. St. Louis, A. & T. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 830, 6 So. 640, 641
(1889) : "Mere consequential damage to property, when the property itself was not
taken, was not recoverable; and much less any damages resulting to individual
owners, in the way of discomfort, inconvenience, loss of business and the like....
The article 156 of the present constitution, in providing that 'private property
shall not be taken nor damaged for public purposes without adequate compensa-
tion, etc.,' only extended its protecting shield over one additional injury and re-
quired compensation, not only for property taken, but also for property dam-
aged .... There is no warrant for extending the liability one whit beyond this. ...
Mere consequential injuries to the owners arising from discomfort, disturbance,
injury to business and the like, remain, as they were before, damnum absque in-
juria, particular sacrifices which society has the right to inflict for the public
good."
37. See generally, JAnE, EMINENT DOMAN 155 (1953).
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is that the damage provision was only intended to extend re-
covery to injuries incurred in a different factual context than
that in which recovery was possible before, and that additional
injuries different in nature did not come within the coverage of
the amendment. 8 An examination of these offered justifications
may be in order, but such is beyond the purview of this Com-
ment.89 Incidental damages have been presented briefly here
only so that the main factors which determine whether an in-
jury will be considered a recoverable damage under the constitu-
tional provision can be seen.
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
A depreciation in the market value of property may be re-
coverable as a constitutional damaging so long as there is an
actual appropriation of at least a portion of the injured prop-
erty40 or so long as there is a physical invasion of it which
amounts in fact to a taking4' if the before and after rule42 of
valuating compensation is employed. It is where neither of these
factors is present that the real problem in applying the damage
provision of the Constitution comes to the front. There would
appear to be no reason in theory for denying recovery to an
owner who has suffered depreciation in the market value of his
property because there has been no physical appropriation of
any portion of it. To require some taking as a condition prece-
dent to recovery for damages would be to predicate recovery in
some cases on the mere fortuitous selection of location by the
taker, denying recovery in other cases by a matter of inches.
Where there is no damage provision, however, this is the general
result.4 Even where there is such a provision, judicial reason-
ing predicated on the conceptual idea of a physical taking may
prevent recovery of injuries which are consequential. 44 Most
38. McMahon v. St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640
(1889) to some extent would support such a conclusion.
39. See Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 61 (1957).
40. This follows due to the liberal interpretation which can be given the word
"taken" so as to encompass these damages. As soon as there is a physical ap-
propriation the court moves into a consideration analyzing according to the rules
discussed above relative to severance damages.
41. See Brockett v. Shreveport, 160 La. 105, 106 So. 710 (1926) (flooding of
plaintiff's land with water, damages recoverable).
42. Under the rule of Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So.2d 260
(1956).
43. See the federal cases in note 4 supra and compare the Federal Constitution,
Xmendment V, with the Louisiana Constitution Article I, § 2.
44. Generally, it seems that those states which incorporate a damage provi-
sion in their constitutions do not require that there be a physical appropriation.
See 2 NiCiOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.441 (1) (3d ed. 1950), who seems to reject
[Vol. XIX
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jurisdictions, however, allowed recovery for severance damages
in a partial taking case even prior to the adoption of the dam-
age provisions by some manner or means, generally by extending
the legal meaning of the word "taking. ' 45 Thus it would appear
that the chief objective of the constitutional amendment was to
cover those injuries incurred where there was no "taking," and
this is the position of Louisiana.
46
the contention that the constitutional provision for damages extends coverage
equally to those cases where there is no physical appropriation as well as to those
where there is such appropriation. He says such a position has received "some
support," but is rejected in most jurisdictions because it is "too broad." JAHR,
EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 47, 51 (1953) indicates that the damage provision is con-
sidered by some states as inoperative until there is some physical appropriation..
ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1953) generally considers
damages only in the situations of a partial taking case. See Note, 10 FLA. L. R1EV.
354 (1957) (Florida does not have a damage provision, does not allow recovery
for consequential damages). The federal rule under the Federal Constitution is
similar. See note 4 8upra.
45. The chief impetus for the adoption of the damage provision occurred in
connection with consequential damages resulting from alterations in the grades
of streets. See 2 NicHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.38(4) (3d ed. 1950). Previous
to such adoption the more liberal states were allowing recovery for such injuries,
under a strained interpretation of the word "taken." Ibid.
46. The leading case involving an interpretation of the recovery of consequen-
tial damages is McMahon v. St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. RB., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So.
640 (1889): The court said: "Prior to the constitution of 1879 the . . .law of this
state .. . simply provided that 'private property shall not be taken for public pur-
poses without adequate compensation, etc.' Under this rule, in absence of other
special provision, a taking of the property was a condition precedent to liability.
. . . Mere consequential damage to property, when the property itself was not
taken, was not recoverable. . . .The article 156 [now Article I, § 2] of the pres-
ent [1879] constitution . . . extended its protective shield over one additional
injury, and required compensation, not only for property taken, but also for prop-
erty damaged." Id. at 830, 6 So. at 641. This decision and rationale have been
reaffirmed many times. Although McMahon is often cited as the first case con-
struing the damage provision, there were in fact two prior cases. Vicksburg, S. &
P.. Ry. v. Dillard, 35 La. Ann. 1045 (1883) considered it in a partial taking case.
Griffin v. Shreveport & Ark. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 808, 809 (1889) apparently is the.
first case to apply the provision to consequential damages, but its rationale is not
so complete as that of McMahon. "A similar article in the Constitution of the.
State of Illinois has recently passed under the review of the Supreme Court of
the United States, and it was held that under such provision, a recovery may be
had in all cases where private property has sustained a substantial injury from
the making and use of a public improvement, whether the damage be direct, as
when caused by trespass or physical invasion of the property, or consequential, as
in a diminution of its market value. . . .The opinion is well considered and con-
forms to the rulings of the Supreme Court of Illinois on the same subject . . . The
doctrinp -ms to us clearly correct and we adopt it. It follows that the authori-
zation by tne airy of Shreveport cannot avail to protect the defendant. Had the:
city itself done the work it would have been responsible."
The most thorough case considering the provision from the legal and historical
viewpoint is Jarnagin v. Highway Comm., 5 So.2d 660, 664 (La. App. 1942) : "We
are of the opinion that a physical invasion of real property or of a real right
is not indispensable to the infliction of damages within the meaning of the consti-
tutional guaranty under discussion. If the public improvement, as a consequential
effect, .has caused special damage to property, such as is not sustained by the
public or the neighborhood generally, whether it abuts the improvement or not, an.
action lies to recover." (Emphasis added.)
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NECESSARY ELEMENTS TO HAVE CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
The main consideration necessary to a finding of consequen-
tial damages is a diminution of the market value of the prop-
erty.47 This is the only injury which is here compensated and
it should make no difference how the cause of the injury origi-
nated so long as the cause is certain 48 and was performed to
further the public benefit.49 Thus the four elements mentioned
above which produced severance damages should also be held to
produce consequential damages provided the following rules are
fulfilled. The quantum recoverable is measured by the diminu-
tion in market value and not by ex delicto standards.1° Even
though this diminution is the main consideration here, it alone
will not produce recoverable injuries. The depreciation produced
by public improvements can be so extensive that it would be
prohibitively expensive to reimburse it all. Thus there is the
further requirement that only those injuries which specially
affect the property as distinguished from that which affect the
community in general can be recovered. More specifically, it
47. See cases cited in note 7 supra. See also Thomas & Warner v. New Or-
leans, 230 La. 1024, 89 So.2d 885 (1956) ; Harrison v. Louisiana Highway Comm.,
191 La. 839, 186 So. 354 (1939) ; Cahn v. Shreveport, 140 La. 158, 72 So. 909
(1916) ; Britt v. Shreveport, 83 So.2d 476 (La. App. 1955).
Plaintiff's petition must allege diminution in market value; if cost of repairs
is sought, the petition will be subject to an exception of no cause of action. Beck
v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 72 So.2d 765 (La. App. 1954).
48. It is elementary that there must be a causal relationship between the con-
struction and the fact of injury, yet in most cases this point is tacitly conceded.
However, in Harrison v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 191 La. 839, 186 So. 354
(1939), the court felt that adequate proof of the cause relationship had not been
established in view of the possibility that the diminution of market value might
have been due to the general economic depression. It would seem that the injury
due to the public improvement need only be proved and should not be required to
be the sole cause of any diminution in market value, since the other applicable
rules (e.g., before and after rule of measure) should eliminate any injury pro-
duced by causes other than the public improvement.
49. This is the rule of Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948).
See note 71 infra. See Beck v. Bob Bros. Const. Co., 72 So.2d 765 (La. App.
1954) (vibrations from cement mixer allegedly caused damage to plaintiff's house).
The court fell into error by using the syllabus of Angelle and refused recovery. Of.
Kendall v. People's Gas & Fuel Co., 138 So. 254 (La. App. 1933). Constitutional
provision held not applicable to damages caused by gas killing trees since no public
purpose was involved.
It is not necessary that the injury occur during the construction of the public
improvement (one that will benefit the public interest) ; it is sufficient if the
injury arose in connection with the operation of this public improvement, see
McMahon v. St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889).
50. See Aleman v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 196 La. 428, 199 So. 380 (1940)
Harrison v. Highway Comm., 191 La. 839, 186 So. 354 (1939); Manning v.
Shreveport, 199 La. 1044, 44 So. 882 (1907) ; Britt v. Shreveport, 83 So.2d 476
(La. App. 1955) ; Jarnagin v. Highway Comm., 5 So.2d 660 (La. App. 1942).
This distinction from a tortious action causes the amount recoverable to be re-
spectively different. See Hebert v. T. L. James & Co., 72 So.2d 754 (La. App.
1954), which makes this point clear.
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has been held that before recovery will lie, the injuries must
differ in kind from that received by the community in general;
distinction by degree alone will not be sufficient.5 1 Mere in-
jurious diversion of traffic does not constitute a cause of ac-
tion,52 probably because to hold otherwise would seriously
hamper the exercise of police power in controlling the flow of
traffic. Yet, if ingress and egress of the property is interfered
with, damages are recoverable under the constitutional provi-
sion. 5 3 By legislative provision, any special benefit inuring to
the property by reason of street improvements may be offset
against any damages falling on the property. 54  However, since
the method of computing the amount of the damages is by taking
the difference in market value before and immediately after
the injury, it would appear that benefit offset is inherent in the
computation and it need not be specifically considered. 55 Since
the amount of damages cannot be determined before the erection
of the improvement, Louisiana's general requirement of previous
compensation 56 before acquisition has no application to conse-
51. Jarnagin v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 5 So.2d 660 (La. App. 1942).
Most of these rules set forth here relative to consequential damages are also ap-
plicable to severance damages, except perhaps this one. This is clearly brought out
in City of Crookston v. Erickson, 69 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1955). Notice though,
that as long as there is a portion of the property actually acquired, the remaining
property is almost certain to be "specially" damaged.
52. Patin v. New Orleans, 223 La. 703, 66 So.2d 616 (1953). Another justifi-
cation for the refusal of recovery here may be seen by reference to the special not
general rule. Jarnagin v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 5 So.2d 660 (La. App.
1942). Mere injurious diversion of traffic is suffered by the public as a whole.
See Thomas & Warner Inc. v. New Orleans, 230 La. 1024, 89 So.2d 885 (1956).
If the diversion amounts to a destruction of the appropriate use of the property,
damages are recoverable. Smith v. New Orleans, 230 La. 282, 88 So.2d 221 (1956).
See also Ramelli v. New Orleans, 233 La. 291, 96 So.2d 572 (1957) ; Schlesinger
v. New Orleans, 233 La. 300, 96 So.2d 575 (1957) ; Lillis v. New Orleans, 233
La. 301, 96 So.2d 575 (1957).
53. This is clearly brought out in Patin v. New Orleans, 223 La. 703, 66 So.2d
616 (1953) in explaining the holding of the case of Harrison v. Louisiana High-
way Comm., 202 La. 345, 11 So.2d 612 (1942). The companion cases of Carter
v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 6 So.2d 159 (La. App. 1942) ; Sholars v. Louisiana
Highway Comm., 6 So.2d 153 (La. App. 1942) ; Jarnagin v. Louisiana Highway
Comm., 5 So.2d 660 (La. App. 1942); Thieme v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 5
So.2d 167 (La. App. 1941) offer an illustration of how this rule operates. All of
the properties involved in the cases were injured by the same construction, but re-
covery was allowed only in Sholars and Carter.
54. LA. R.S. 33:3742 (1950). Notice the particular wording of the statute.
55. See Britt v. Shreveport, 83 So.2d 476 (La. App. 1955). See also LA. R.S.
33:3742 (1950), which provides that in street constructions which injure adjoin-
ing property, special benefits may be offset. The determination of the recoverable
quantum automatically considers the effect of any benefits which the property may
receive (since the formula for determining the extent of the injury is the differ-
ence between the market value of the property before the injury and after the
injury). Such a formula, however, would incorporate general benefits and thus
an adjustment may be required since only special benefits may be offset. Manning
v. Shreveport, 119 La. 1044, 44 So. 882 (1907).
56. LA. CONST. arts. 1, § 2, 1V, § 15; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2629 (1870).
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quential damages.57 It naturally follows then, that so long as the
taker or actor moves lawfully,5 the owner cannot enjoin him
from injuring his property5 9 if there is no physical trespass
thereon. 0 The prescriptive period applicable to an owner's claim
for consequential damages is slightly confused. 61 It seems clear,
however, that the general one-year tort prescription for damage
to property is not applicable. 2 It is submitted that R.S. 9:5603
and R.S. 9:5624 squarely contemplate consequential damages as
defined in this Comment. Thus where the damages arise in con-
nection with an improvement of streets they are prescribed in
.57. Kuhn v. Highway Comm., 174 La. 990, 142 So. 149 (1932) and McMahon
v. St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889). But see
Shreveport Traction Co. v. Svara, 133 La. 900, 63 So. 396 (1913) (requirement
of previous compensation held applicable to damage claims arising out of a par-
tial taking).
58. See Tilton v. New Orleans City R.R., 35 La. Ann. 1062 (1883) (opera-
tion of trains by steam unauthorized, so injunction would lie).
59. Kuhn v. Highway Comm., 174 La. 990, 142 So. 149 (1932).
60. Brockett v. Shreveport, 160 La. 105, 106 So. 710 (1925) (flooding of plain-
tiff's land- injunction would ordinarily lie, but laches of plaintiff precluded its
use here).
61. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2630 (1870) and LA. R.S. 19:2.1 (1950). The
source of these provisions apparently is La. Acts 1855, No. 38, p. 32: "All claims
for land, or damages to the owner, caused by its expropriation for the construc-
tion of any public works, shall be barred by two years prescription, which shall
commence to run from the date at which the land was actually occupied and used
for the construction of the works." This provision was incorporated in LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2630 (1870) and LA. R.S. § 1479 (1870). Subsequent amendments oc-
curred by La. Acts 1896, No. 96, p. 142, which added the words "taking or" be-
fore the word expropriation in LA. R.S. § 1479 (1870) and by La. Acts 1886, No.
117, p. 215; La. Acts 1902, No. 227, p. 457; and La. Acts 1906, No. 208, p. 362,
which made no substantive change in the provision. The exact situation covered
by this provision is unclear. Amet v. Texas & P. Ry., 117 La. 454, 41 So. 721
(1906) held that it applied to a situation where there was acquisition after the
award of a jury but before there was actual payment. Amet says such procedure
is no longer available. See Poindexter v. Louisiana & A. Ry., 124 So. 535 (La.
App. 1929), affirming Amet in this interpretation, reversed on other grounds; 170
La. 521, 128 So. 297 (1930). But cf. the cases of Donaldson's Heirs v. New Or-
leans, 166 La. 1059, 118 So. 134 (1928) (two-year prescription applied and plain-
tiff's suit for possession or value of land and damages dismissed) and Bourree v.
Roy, 232 La. 149, 94 So.2d 13 (1957), where the court found it unnecessary to
pass on the applicability of Article 2630 and R.S. 9:5624. Application of this two-
year provision to a situation where the taker enters without suit would result in
undue hardship. See Amet v. Texas & P. Ry., 117 La. 454, 458, 41 So. 721, 722
(1906) : "We cannot on the face of the Act [now La. Acts 1955, No. 38, incor-
porated in LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2630 (1870)] presume the deliberate legislative
intention of interpolating in an expropriation statute a new law of prescription
to enable corporations to acquire title to lands by mere occupancy, without legal
right or title, for the short period of two years from the date of the trespass."
An interesting interpretation was made by Tremont & Gulf Ry. v. Louisiana
& A. Ry., 128 La. 299, 54 So. 826 (1911), which apparently held that where a
taker enters without suit, he may be ejected and held for damages if the owner
acts within two years. In effect, this would place a two-year limitation on an
application of the rule of St. Julien v. Morgan Louisiana & Texas R.R., 35 La.
Ann. 924 (1883). See Comment, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 509, 533 (1958) and
cases cited at 534, n. 176.
62. Foster v. New Orleans, 155 La. 889, 99 So. 686 (1924).
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one year by application of R.S. 9:5603.3 Where they, arise in
any other context, the claim for damages should prescribe in
two years under R.S. 9:5624.64
FACTUAL SITUATION OF THE CAUSE FACTOR
The chief point of trouble in determining the application of
the constitutional damage provision has centered around the de-
termination of what factual situation should be held to produce
recoverable damages. The context of the provision itself would
seem to act as a limitation in this respect, restricting recovery
to injuries, produced in the public interest only where the power
of eminent domain was involved.6 5
Considerable litigation has been centered around the possi-
bility of the inclusion of an injury produced by negligence of
public employees as a cause of action under the constitutional
provision. In De Moss v. Police Jury"6 a lessee's crops were
destroyed as a result of the negligence of public employees en-
gaged in a public improvement. There, although the court had
an applicable special statute encompassing such damages, it
found it necessary to further buttress its allowance of recovery
63. LA. R.S. 9:5603 (1950) : "Actions for the recovery of damages to person
or property by reason of the grading of any public way by any municipality are
prescribed by one year, reckoning from the time the damage was sustained." In
view of the self operation generally afforded eminent domain statutes, the use of
the word "person" in the above statute might be held to circumvent the sovereign
immunity concept for personal injuries in this limited situation.
64. LA. R.S. 9:5624 (1950) : "When private property is damaged for public
purposes any and all actions for such damages are prescribed by the prescription
of two years, which shall begin to run when the damages are sustained."
In Louisiana Legislation of 1950, 11 LouiSIANA LAW REVIEw 22, 36 (1950),
it is suggested that the above statute was adopted to clarify the prescription pro-
vision of LA. R.S. 19:2.1 (Supp. 1950). It is submitted that it is not likely that
the legislature intended to do this, as both provisions originate as acts of the
same session: R.S. 19:2.1 as La. Acts 1950, No. 238, and R.S. 9:5624 as La. Acts
1950, No. 421, § 1. In view of the precise wording of R.S. 9:5624 (no reference
therein made to claims for land or property, only damages) it no doubt can be
applied to consequential damages. It is quite probable that R.S. 19 :2.1 (La. Acts
1950, No. 238) was passed to correct an oversight which omitted the inclusion of
that specific procedure (originally LA. R.S. § 1479 (1870)) in the original com-
pilation of the Revised Statutes of 1950. Louisiana Legislation of 1950, supra at
48. In doing so, the prescriptive provision was also included, although its exact
application, as mentioned in note 61 supra, is doubtful.
65. Note that it should not be held necessary to a recovery of damages that
there be an actual exercise of the power of eminent domain. It is the possession
of the power of eminent domain that has placed the taker-actor in a position to
injure the landowner. Thus even though there is no exercise of that power either
on the injured landowner or adjacent landowners, recovery should lie if market
value is depreciated by the construction or operation of the improvement concerned.
Injury resulting merely while a public purpose was being served should not be
sufficient to constitute recoverable damages under the constitutional provision.
66. 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700 (1928).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
by reference to the constitutional provision. Since this provi-
sion is self operating67 and recovery under it does not need spe-
cial legislative authorization, the holding of the De Moss case
effectively eliminated the protection of sovereign immunity
where the torts of public employees arose in the context of an
exercise of the power of eminent domain. 68 In Angelle v. State69
suit was pressed under the constitutional provision for damages
incurred through the negligence of state employees who were
not engaged in any work connected with the power of eminent
domain. This lack of connection with the spirit of the constitu-
tional provision should have been sufficient reason to deny re-
covery, but unfortunately the court felt it necessary to go further
and overrule the De Moss rule insofar as it relied on the con-
stitutional provision.70 In one of those few instances where the
court has generalized on the constitutional provision, Angelle
established the rule that recovery was possible under the provi-
sion only where the injury occurred as a necessary consequence
of a public undertaking,71 eliminating the De Moss coverage of
negligent injury.
THE BURAS PROBLEM
In another case involving a generalization as to the possi-
bility of recovery under the constitutional provision, the court
has recently brought a considerable portion of the prior law of
this area into question, especially the Angelle rule. In Buras Ice
67. Scorsune v. State, 224 La. 1031, 71 So.2d 557 (1954) ; Nagle v. Police
Jury, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425 (1932), although these were partial taking cases,
the rule should be applicable in the situation of consequential damages as well.
See Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948).
68. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term-
Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 224 (1949).
69. 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948).
70. The court in Angelle relied heavily on federal authorities which do not
completely substantiate the position taken, since consequential damages are not
recoverable at all under the Federal Constitution. See The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term - Constitutional Law, 9 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 164 (1949). See note 4 supra. Nevertheless, the result reached by Angelle
seems to be the majority position of those jurisdictions which have found it neces-
sary to consider this point. See the Note on Eriksen v. Anderson, 195 Va. 655,
79 S.E.2d 597 (1954) in 40 VA. L. REV. 373 (1954). See the cases cited in the
annotation for Angelle, 2 A.L.R.2d 666, 677 (1948).
71. Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 1085, 34 So.2d 321, 326 (1948): "[We
view the constitutional provision as applicable only to cases where the taking or
damaging of the private property is intentional or occurs as a necessary conse-
quence of the public undertaking." (Emphasis added.) The italicized words should
be taken to refer to the element of foreseeability. Thus, where the injury is
anticipated (intentional), it must be compensated, as well as where, though not
anticipated, it results as a natural consequence of the improvement. The Angelle
rule should be understood to exclude from the operation of the constitutional pro-
vision negligent (and intentional) torts of state employees.
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Factory v. Department of Highways,72 the landowner had an ice
factory located at the head of a canal which was owned by a
third person. Plaintiff's ice factory supplied shrimp boats which
came up the canal to be serviced with ice. The canal owner sold
a right of way over the canal to the State Highway Department
which filled in a portion of the canal for a roadway across it.
This fill blocked the canal and prevented the boats coming up it,
thus rendering plaintiff's factory almost completely valueless.
Seeking recovery under the constitutional provision, plaintiff
received the value of his ice plant in the district court. On appeal
to the Supreme Court, the lower court was reversed and recovery
denied. Finding that plaintiff had no servitude in the canal, the
court said that he could not have recovered from a third person
if they had filled in the canal and thus no cause of action existed
against the highway department. Recovery under the provision
in the Constitution was said to be possible only where the in-
jury would have been recoverable under Articles 2315 or 667 of
the Civil Code had it been done by an individual or private cor-
poration. 78 An exception to this general rule was said to exist
in the case of injury to property abutting a public street where
it was damaged by a change in the grade of that street.
It was the original concept in this area that injury suffered
because of public works should be uncompensated because of the
public benefit involved; the injury was said to be damnum absque
injuria.7 4 The taking and damaging provisions of the state con-
stitutions abrogated this principle when it became evident that
harsh injuries were being absorbed by individuals when they
should be spread out over the general public who benefitted
thereby.75 It could well be said that the damage provision was
intended only to remove an outdated obstacle to an otherwise
existing cause of action and not to create one where none existed
before.76 There is but slight authority to the effect that the
constitutional provision was intended to create a new cause of
action requiring no evaluation via conventional and established
principles of liability. 77 Nevertheless, it is submitted that this
72. 235 La. 158, 103 So.2d 74 (1958).
73. It should be noted that under Louisiana law only a corporation or state
agency or a political subdivision can exercise the power of eminent domain. See
generally Title 19 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950.
74. See the historical presentation in Jarnagin v. Highway Comm., 5 So.2d 660
(La. App. 1942) and McMahon v. St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R.R., 41 La: Ann. 827,
6 So. 640 (1889).
75. See generally 2 NicHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.38 et seq. (3d ed. 1950).
76. See id. §6.441(2).
77. See ibid.: "To lay down the rule that :damage in the constitutional sense
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interpretation, holding that injury under the constitutional pro-
vision should be compensated, although it would not be recover-
able in a situation between private persons, is sound, logical,
and more consonant with the ends sought to be reached with
eminent domain legislation than is the Buras rule.
If one works from the premise that every injury should be
compensated unless there is a sound reason for not doing so,
one of the most obvious reasons for restricting recovery here is
the administrative reason. Even though the facts of Buras
present a rare situation, the lack of a servitude in the canal
seems to be slight reason for denying recovery. Probably the
court felt that any other course would have resulted in an ad-
ministratively unwieldly flood of litigation in reference to public
improvements. But this need not follow in light of the other
rules which are necessary to recovery under the Constitution.
Buras then may be an unnecessary gloss on the constitutional
provision engendering difficult problems of proof if it is to be
followed. The damnum absque injuria rule precluded any con-
sideration of recovery in this area once it was found that the
public was to benefit from the construction. Thus there was no
elaboration of any principles of liability where massive construc-
tions were made on adjacent land by public concerns. Neither
has there been any elaboration of possible liability where pri-
vate persons erected such constructions, simply because private
persons do not build roadways, overpasses, bridges, and so
forth.7 8 Zoning restrictions and other governmental controls
limit the possible constructions which a person may make on his
property to improvements which seldom depreciate the value of
adjoining land. If Angelle is still to be considered operative 7 9
is such injury and such injury only as would be actionable if done by a private
individual neither clarifies the situation nor gives the clause a broad enough mean-
ing to include the specific form of injustice which it was chiefly intended to
remedy. . . .Common law liability is undoubtedly an indication of damage; but
lack of liability at common law should not conclusively prove that there is no dam-
age under the constitutional provision." See Omaha v. Kramer, 25 Neb. 489, 41
N.W. 295 (1889). See also the very early Comment on this problem in 12 ALBANY
L.J. 53 (1875).
78. See 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.441(2) (3d ed. 1950) : "Few public
improvements which injuriously affect adjoining land are of such a character that
similar structures have been erected without legislative authority frequently
enough to have settled the question whether they would constitute an actionable
injury at common law, so that the proposed test [similar to that laid down in the
Buras case] is in most cases useless. Furthermore, many of the injuries from
public improvements which cause the greatest hardship to individuals would not
be actionable at common law."
79. Angelle would exclude any consideration of a situation involving intention-
al or negligent injury which did not result as a "natural consequence" of the
public improvement. Buras apparently did not intend to overrule this principle.
[Vol. XIX
COMMENTS
precluding the inclusion of negligent injuries from the scope of
the constitutional provision, the Buras rule will in effect limit
recovery under the constitutional provision to those cases where
the public improvement takes on the nature of a nuisance. Such
a restrictive interpretation of the provision seems to do violence
to its spirit.
Society is presently making great demands on the individual
as more and larger public improvements are being constructed.
Under the power of eminent domain many injuries are inflicted
on the hapless individual which have traditionally been refused
recovery. Reconsideration would now seem to be in order; society
should pay for the damage that it causes.
Admittedly there is persuasive logic in the argument that to
allow recovery where there would be none if the injury were
inflicted for private gain, in cases involving improvements for
the public good, would be to predicate liability on the mere fact
that the public will receive some benefit. 8° The answer to this
argument is that in one case the power of eminent domain is
available and in the other it is not.
Where non-recoverable injuries are found between private
persons, there will also be found some element of reciprocity.-
Either property owner may injure the other owner's property
and each takes his property knowing full well that any benefit
which his property may have by reason of the present use or
non-use of the adjacent land are only temporary in nature. In-.
jury in such cases may come in the form of a deprivation of
view, light, or air; and there the injured property may be said
to be merely deprived of a temporary benefit and not damaged
in the sense that some inherent quality is destroyed. If the in-
jury is to be avoided, the property owner who may be injured
may attempt to buy out the othier owner and prevent the injury.
But one with the power of eminent domain moves with prover-
bial sureness insofar as acquisition is concerned, and resulting
injuries cannot be avoided.
Therefore the only avenue of liability on which an injured property owner in such
a situation can recover are nuisance and Article 667 of the Civil Code (sic utere).
80. In considering what objections might operate against an argument in favor
of a liberal interpretation of the damage provision, the following is said: "It would
be a strange perversion of legal principles if the right of the owner to recover
damages depended upon his ability to show that the offending structure was
erected for the good of the public rather than for the profit of some individual.".
2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.441(1) (3d ed. 1950). Buras does adopt what
appears to be the decision of the majority of jurisdictions which have passed on
whether or not there has to be a pre-existing cause of action. Id. § 6.41 (1).
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Further, the court in Buras concedes in effect that the gen-
eral rule there pronounced is not sufficient in all cases. An ex-
ception to it is made in cases concerning the grading of streets
which results in injury to adjacent property. The court seems
to predicate this exception on the theory that such an injury
may be considered as a continuation of the injury incurred when
the land for the street was originally taken, thus apparently
bringing into play the rule applicable to severance damages-
so long as there is a taking of a portion, the resulting damages
are recoverable. Logically there need be no such continuation
if the street were laid out in the beginning before any adjacent
land were sold. There is some authority to the effect that an
adjacent landowner in such a case has a right in the street akin
to a servitude which cannot be interfered with without com-
pensation."' It is submitted, however, that this street exception
exists because it presents an easily administered area and prece-
dents allowing recovery in such a situation abound to such an
extent that a contrary ruling would result in a major change in
the law. It must be noted that the street grading situation pro-
vided the impetus for the passage of damage provisions in state
constitutions; thus the principle involved there should be con-
sidered the rule rather than the exception.8 2
In conclusion, in view of the court's past determination to
keep recovery under the provision separate from other areas of
the law, it is surprising to find that now the existence of a cause
of action under the constitutional provision must be determined
by the existence of a cause of action under another area of the
law." The ingrafting of the sic utere rule of Article 667 onto
81. State v. Dowling, 205 La. 1061, 18 So.2d 616 (1944) ; Gobelin v. Depart-
ment of Highways, 200 La. 409, 8 So.2d 71 (1942).
82. 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.441(2) (3d ed. 1950) : "Thus the right
of a private owner to pile up a mound of earth on his own land close to his neigh-
bor's line, or to excavate on his own land so long as he did not deprive his neigh-
bor's soil of support, was unquestioned at common law; and yet the right of a
city or town to do this same thing in the course of grading a street without liabil-
ity to the adjoining owner was the chief cause of dissatisfaction with the doctrine
that unless there was a taking there was no right to compensation."
83. The prior jurisprudence generally held in effect that no element of a tor-
tious action should be construed as relative to a damaging under the Constitution.
Thus under the latter, no consent was necessary to sue. See note 67 supra. The
recovery was measured under the Constitution by the diminution in market value,
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Maguire, 219 La. 740, 54 So.2d 4 (1951), and not
the cost of restoration and the value of the lost use, Hebert v. T. L. James & Co.,
72 So.2d 754 (La. App. 1954) and Jarnagin v. Highway Comm., 5 So.2d 660 (La.
App. 1942). Negligence was not a required item of proof under the Constitution,
Hebert v. T. L. James & Co., supra, and Aleman v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 196
La. 428, 199 So. 380 (1940), and the one-year tort prescription did not apply,
Foster v. New Orleans, 155 La. 889, 99 Sa. 686 (1924).
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the constitutional provision will probably create confusion in
this area and thereby greatly limit recovery.8
Buras also said there could be no recovery under the con-
stitutional provision unless there could be recovery against a
private individual or corporation (presumably not possessing
the power of eminent domain) under Article 2315, Louisiana's
general fault article. Taken literally, the language of Buras im-
plies that general tortious conduct now falls under the constitu-
tional provision. Since the constitutional provision is self op-
erating, this interpretation would result in the abrogation of the
rule of sovereign immunity heretofore operative in Louisiana.
It is submitted that this was not intended by the court and will
not follow from the Buras decision. The rule of Buras should
be taken in context with the rule of Angelle.85 If this is done, it
will follow that the injury must result in connection with the
exercise of eminent domain and as a natural consequence of the
public improvement. Furthermore, those injuries mentioned
above as incidental, and non-recoverable under the rules of
eminent domain, are recoverable in some respects under general
tort law; but for the same reasons just mentioned Buras prob-
ably did not intend to make them now recoverable under the
constitutional provision.8 6 Clarification of the impact of the
Buras decision on tortious injuries and incidental damages will
have to await a case with a factual situation similar to Angelle
where plaintiff resorts to the constitutional provision.
If Buras is taken as simply an additional rule to the hereto-
fore established rules applicable to the constitutional provision,
it is submitted that recovery under that provision will be pos-
84. Concerning Article 667, see Note, 32 TuL. L. REV. 146 (1957). The ap-
plicability of Article 667 to the state was questioned by inference in Beck v. Bob
Bros. Const. Co., 72 So.2d 765, 769 (La. App. 1954), where the court said: "Surely
the redactors of the Civil Code did not intend to apply this article to a municipal-
ity." It would seem that, a fortiori, they did not intend that that article be ap-
plied to the state.
85. Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948).
86. A literal interpretation of the language used in Buras would indicate that
if there exists a cause of action at the general law, then there exists a cause of
action under the constitutional provision. Such a position would place Louisiana
out of line with innumerable authorities if this were held to encompass those in-
juries described above (see notes 31-35 supra) as incidental. JAHR, EMINENT
DOMAIN c. xvi (1953) ; 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN C. v (2d
ed. 1953).
It was early held that certain incidental injuries (which may constitute a
cause of action if occurring in another context where the actor is a private con-
cern) are not recoverable under the constitutional provision when incurred for a
public purpose. They remain as they were, damnum absque injuria. McMahon v.
St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889).
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sible for consequential damages where: (1) there is a diminution
in market value, (2) the diminution results as a natural conse-
quence from the erection or operation of a public improvement,
(3) the injury is special in degree to the affected property, and
(4) there exists a cause of action for the injury under Article
667 if it had been caused by an individual.
If the injury results from street improvements, then under
the exception set forth in Buras, rule four above is not ap-
plicable.
Joseph G. Hebert
